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Article

Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit
Crucible
Jonathan R. Siegel†
We do not really know whether judicial reliance on legislative history or other interpretive techniques that go beyond
simply enforcing plain text is helpful, but we do know that
these techniques are expensive. Therefore, courts should reject
them.
That, in a nutshell, is Adrian Vermeule’s challenge to the
community of interpretation scholars. His new book, Judging
Under Uncertainty,1 eschews, and attempts to transcend, the
main elements of the long-standing debates over methods that
courts should use to interpret statutes and the Constitution.
Countless judges and scholars have attempted to prove that
particular interpretive methods are constitutionally required or
Vermeule
rejects
these
constitutionally
illegitimate;2
† Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. A.B.
Harvard University; J.D. Yale Law School. The production of this Article was
supported by a grant from the George Washington University Law School,
which I acknowledge with gratitude. I would like to thank my colleague Michael Abramowicz for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
Copyright © 2007 by Jonathan R. Siegel.
VERMEULE,
JUDGING
UNDER
UNCERTAINTY:
AN
1. ADRIAN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). For reviews, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041 (2006)
(book review); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (2007) (book review).
2. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.”);
ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 35 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that reliance on legislative history is unconstitutional); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
990, 991–98 (2001) (arguing that the Constitution permits nontextualist interpretive practices); John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1649–51 (2001) (arguing
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efforts.3 Similarly, he sees no need to resolve apparently burning questions such as whether courts are bound by what legislatures write, or by what legislatures intend4—again distancing
himself from innumerable arguments in the scholarly literature.5 For Vermeule, everything comes down to a simple but withering cost-benefit analysis involving two factors: the empirical uncertainty regarding the benefits of interpretive methods
that do more than simply enforce plain text, and the costs of
those methods.6 Because we lack, and probably cannot hope to
get, data that could tell us whether these methods move courts
that our constitutional structure compels courts to adopt the “faithful agent”
model of statutory interpretation and to reject the English practice of equitable interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 706–07 (1997) (arguing that the constitutional rule
against congressional self-aggrandizement prohibits reliance on legislative
history in statutory interpretation); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative
History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1460–61
(2000) [hereinafter Siegel, Use of Legislative History] (arguing that the Constitution permits courts to consult legislative history, but imposes some limits on
what may constitute consultable legislative history).
3. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 31 (“[C]onstitutional premises . . .
mandate neither formalist interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive
methods . . . . The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal
about the contested issues of statutory interpretation . . . .”).
4. See id. at 87 (arguing that it might be possible to “bracket” this and
other high-level questions altogether, if institutional considerations show that
judges should, in practice, use the same interpretive techniques under any
theory of the ultimate goals of interpretation).
5. Compare, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 2, at 16–18 (“[D]espite frequent
statements to the contrary, [courts] do not really look for subjective legislative
intent.”), and Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67–68 (1994) (“[S]tatutory text
and structure, as opposed to legislative history and intent (actual or imputed),
supply the proper foundation for meaning. . . . Intent is empty. . . . Intent is
elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”), and Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992) (“Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression.”), with WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES 59 (photo. reprint 1979) (1765) (“The fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at
the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”),
and Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281, 301 (1990) (“[W]hen we are called upon to interpret statutes, it is our primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, to
subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because the legislators’ collective intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court. . . . Congress
makes the laws, I try to enforce them as Congress meant them to be enforced.”).
6. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 153–229.
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closer to or further away from any accepted interpretive goal,
and because we do know that the methods are costly, Vermeule
believes courts should reject them.7
The goal of this Article is to engage Professor Vermeule’s
arguments and to respond to the substantial challenge that his
book presents to the interpretation scholarship community. In
essence, Vermeule challenges interpretation scholars to justify
their allegedly sophisticated interpretive recommendations. For
decades (indeed, centuries), interpretive theorists have debated
the goals of statutory interpretation and have offered innumerable prescriptions for how courts might best achieve those
goals.8 But, Vermeule argues, scholars have neglected critical
elements of the inquiry by naively assuming that judges might
adopt their pet interpretive theories en masse and execute
them perfectly.9 Vermeule claims that prominent interpretive
theorists have neglected to consider the inevitable, institutional
limitations on judicial interpretation—limits that stem from
judges’ cognitive limitations, from the limits on their time and
resources, and from each judge’s inability to compel other
judges to adopt preferred interpretive methods.10 No interpretive theory, Vermeule concludes, can be correct unless it incorporates the institutional limitations that may cause courts to
err.11 Vermeule’s theory of interpretation focuses almost exclusively on these limitations.
The result is perhaps the most austere vision of the judicial
interpretive role ever put forward. Vermeule argues that, in
cases where the statutory text at issue is unambiguous and
specifically addresses the question before the court, the court
should enforce the statute’s text and eschew all other considerations, such as legislative history, interpretation of the statutory text in light of similar text in other statutes, and canons of

7. See id.
8. Blackstone’s assertion of the judicial power to depart from statutory
text that dictates an absurd result goes back to 1765. See BLACKSTONE, supra
note 5, at 60. Blackstone relies on the work of Pufendorf, published a century
earlier. See id.; 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI
OCTO 802 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934)
(1688) (“[W]hen words, if taken in their plain and simple meaning, will produce an absurd or even no effect, some exception must be made from their
more generally accepted sense, that they may not lead to nothingness or absurdity.”).
9. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 36.
10. Id. at 15–39.
11. See id. at 15–18, 36–39.
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construction.12 In cases where the statutory text contains an
ambiguity, courts should defer to administrative or other executive branch constructions of the statute without attempting
to use traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity.13
As with statutes, so too with the Constitution. The courts,
Vermeule argues, should enforce clear and specific constitutional texts, but should disclaim any role beyond that.14 Where
constitutional texts are ambiguous or open ended, courts
should let legislatures interpret them.15 Under this rule,
Vermeule blandly notes, courts would cease enforcing the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.16 In particular,
freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection would all
be remitted to legislative enforcement.17
A bit of a comedown for judges! Vermeule recognizes that
his proposed interpretive methods would make judges rather
humble functionaries18 and pluck the heart out of the academic
enterprise of advising judges regarding statutory interpretation.19 But, Vermeule notes, the goal is not to make judges’
work interesting,20 nor for academics to have fun,21 but to find
interpretive methods that work best for our institutional structure given the empirical uncertainties surrounding the value of
various interpretive methods.22 Vermeule’s book challenges interpretation scholars to ask whether they really have any basis
for believing that their favorite methods make interpretation
better rather than worse.
This Article attempts to respond to Professor Vermeule’s
important challenge. After Part I summarizes Vermeule’s arguments, Part II examines both ends of Vermeule’s cost-benefit
critique. First, Part II.A addresses the “cost” side of Vermeule’s
equation—the claim that discarding all judicial interpretive
methods beyond enforcement of plain text will result in an

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 189, 198, 202–03.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 230–31.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 229, 290.

2007]

COST-BENEFIT CRUCIBLE

391

“enormous” cost savings.23 Part II.A questions whether the
costs of judicial interpretation are really as “enormous” as
Vermeule asserts.24 It also suggests that regardless of the size
of the costs of interpretive methods, implementing Vermeule’s
theory might not eliminate those costs. Adoption of Vermeule’s
theory by only some judges would leave the bulk of the costs in
place,25 and the avoidance of judicial interpretive costs could
result in increased offsetting costs elsewhere in the legal system.26
The remainder of Part II considers the “benefit” side of the
analysis—Vermeule’s claim that there is no way to gauge
whether the interpretive techniques that he rejects have any
positive net benefits.27 This Part suggests that while no one can
precisely measure the value of these techniques, there are reasons to believe that the value is positive. It analyzes different
interpretive contexts that Vermeule discusses and suggests
that the judiciary has important institutional advantages that
apply to each. The judiciary’s institutional features, this Part
suggests, give it a comparative advantage over other institutional bodies in detecting appropriate occasions for departure
from statutory text,28 in checking the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the executive branch,29 and in enforcing constitutional
constraints on the legislative power.30 These institutional advantages suggest that judicial interpretive techniques that go
beyond enforcement of plain text produce value, thus undermining Vermeule’s argument that because such techniques offer zero benefits, we should discard them to avoid their costs.
I. VERMEULE’S CHALLENGE
Before critiquing Professor Vermeule’s theory, it seems only fair to present it in its best light. In compressing three hundred pages into ten, some nuances will undoubtedly be lost.
Professor Vermeule’s main ideas, however, are sufficiently simple that they can be summarized briefly.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

E.g., id. at 194.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.a.
See infra Part II.A.2.b.
E.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 193.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
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A. VERMEULE’S CRITIQUE
Vermeule begins by criticizing prior interpretation scholarship for failing to analyze the institutions that carry out the interpretive process.31 Ignoring this institutional structure,
Vermeule says, is a fundamental error.32 No interpretive theory
can succeed without considering both the capabilities of interpreters to carry it out and the social effects of giving particular
institutions interpretive powers.33
A good picture of Vermeule’s critique emerges from his criticism34 of Blackstone’s acceptance of the principle that courts
should construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results.35 Even if
everyone could agree that “absurd results are bad,” it might not
follow, Vermeule suggests, that courts should have the power to
construe statutes to avoid absurd results.36 He bases his argument not on the conventional, formalist reason that judicial
reform of statutes constitutes an invasion of the legislative
power,37 but on practical reasons stemming from the institutional capability and fallibility of courts.38
If courts have the power to avoid statutory absurdity,
Vermeule notes, it is inevitable that they will sometimes use
that power incorrectly: they will sometimes mistakenly conclude that a statutory application is absurd because the judges
cannot sufficiently appreciate the relevant policies or purposes
behind the statute.39 The costs of mistaken exercises of the absurdity power must be set against the benefits of its correct
use.40 Moreover, judges will have to decide whether any given
application of a statute produces an absurd result, and making
this determination will require courts to expend interpretive
resources, which is another cost that must be considered.41 Fi31. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 16–17.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 19.
35. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 60 (providing the famous example that a law against “letting blood in the streets” should not apply to a
doctor who bleeds a patient who has fallen down in the street in a fit).
36. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 19–20.
37. Id. at 31.
38. See id. at 20–21, 61 (noting that interpretive rules “must be chosen in
light of institutional capacities and the systemic effects of interpretive approaches”).
39. Id. at 20, 38–39.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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nally, giving courts the power to reform statutes introduces uncertainty that also creates costs; parties planning their conduct
must consider the possibility that a court will later disregard
statutory text because it produces a result the court considers
to be absurd.42
The costs of error, of the decision process, and of legal uncertainty are for Vermeule vital institutional considerations
that most interpretation scholarship ignores.43 Vermeule criticizes the main players in the interpretation world for assuming
that judges will perfectly carry out interpretive methods.44 For
example, the purposivism of Hart and Sacks requires judges to
promote legal coherence,45 a fine aspiration. However, Vermeule observes, the theory could go awry if judges wrongly identify the principles and purposes to which the law is then made to
cohere.46 Similarly, William Eskridge’s theory of “dynamic” statutory interpretation47 may successfully refute the formalist,
separation-of-powers objections to judicial “updating” of statutes,48 but it insufficiently considers whether the same objections might be justified on different, institutional grounds. Eskridge does not, Vermeule says, adequately consider whether
dynamism might cause more harm than good, because cases in
which fallible judges mistakenly update statutes (because they
fail to perceive the statutes’ current social utility) might outnumber the cases in which courts update statutes correctly.49
Vermeule similarly addresses Judge Richard Posner’s early
theory of “imaginative reconstruction,”50 which called upon
judges to ask what an enacting legislature would have done if
presented with a given case.51 Vermeule criticizes Posner for
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 36 (“[I]ntellects of the highest caliber have explored interpretive strategies without attending to the fact that such strategies will inevitably be used by fallible institutions.”).
45. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111–1380 (William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (analyzing the role of the
courts in interpreting statutes).
46. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 26–27.
47. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994).
48. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 45.
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id. at 52–53.
51. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpre-
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failing to consider that imaginative reconstruction, if performed
poorly, might drive courts farther away from legislative intent
than would unimaginative, plodding application of statutory
text.52 Posner’s more recent pragmatic theory, which views
judges as “wise elders” and licenses them to interpret statutes
so as to maximize their beneficial social consequences,53 similarly fails, in Vermeule’s view, to consider whether the costs of
decision and the costs of legal uncertainty associated with
pragmatism would outweigh its benefits.54
Vermeule even criticizes John Manning, a formalist whose
ultimate interpretive prescriptions have considerable overlap
with Vermeule’s, for reaching his conclusions on the basis of
constitutional, separation-of-powers arguments, rather than on
the basis of institutional characteristics.55 For Vermeule, constitutional arguments are unsatisfactory guides to interpretive
practices—the Constitution, he says, mandates neither formalist nor nonformalist interpretive methods.56 The focus, according to Vermeule, should be on the institutional characteristics
of the interpreter.57 Through his review and criticism of the
prominent interpretation theories, Vermeule takes the interpretation scholarship community to task for disregarding institutional considerations in developing interpretive theories.
B. VERMEULE’S RECONSTRUCTION
Interpretation scholarship, Vermeule therefore says, must
take an “institutional turn”—it must consider the institutional
characteristics of the interpretive actors in our legal system.58
For Vermeule, several of these characteristics are especially salient: judicial capacities and potential for error, the costs and
systemic effects of interpretive methods, and the difficulties of
methodological coordination within the judiciary.59
tation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 190
(1987).
52. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 52–53.
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235, 244 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
54. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 54.
55. Id. at 29–33.
56. Id. at 31–32.
57. See id. at 36–39.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id. at 86–148.
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Vermeule begins by considering judicial capacities.60 He
argues that debates over proper interpretive methods have focused too much on theoretical considerations and have too often
ignored the question of judicial capacity to perform interpretive
methods properly.61 Vermeule illustrates this point by considering the question of judicial reliance on legislative history.62 He
argues that while formalists and intentionalists have long debated whether or not reliance on legislative history is constitutionally permissible, they have ignored the most vital consideration: whether courts really benefit from, or will merely be
confused by, legislative history.63
To show this, Vermeule presents a detailed critique of the
famous case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.64 He
argues that the Supreme Court, in attempting to use legislative
history to implement congressional intent in that case, misread
the legislative history.65 This case study, Vermeule claims, reveals the importance of considering the possibility of judicial
error.66 It demonstrates that even given a series of generous assumptions—that Congress forms a collective intent about the
meaning of statutory text, that legislative history properly reflects that intent, and that intent is the ultimate touchstone of
statutory meaning—courts should still reject legislative history
because of the problem of judicial capacity.67 Courts, Vermeule
notes, have limited resources and may not be able to properly
process all of a statute’s legislative history, especially given
how voluminous and heterogeneous legislative history can be.68
According to Vermeule, Holy Trinity shows that judicial reliance on legislative history may move courts further from, rather than closer to, the proper interpretation of a statute, even
assuming that legislative history would provide an infallible interpreter with the best guide to statutory meaning.69 If this is
true, perhaps even intentionalists should reject legislative history as an interpretive tool, not because of any theoretical problem with it, but because of the practical problem that it may
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 86–117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 90–102.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 110–17.
Id. at 105–17.
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drive courts further away from what intentionalists themselves
claim is the goal of interpretation—ascertaining legislative intent.70
Based on this example, Vermeule concludes that the generalizable lesson is that many of the apparently great debates in
interpretive theory may be irrelevant.71 If practical considerations dictate that the actual interpretive methods that courts
should use would be the same under both textualist and intentionalist theories, little justification remains for debating which
theory provides the ultimate guide to statutory meaning.72 If
even an intentionalist would conclude on the basis of intentionalist theory that, in light of the possibility of judicial error,
courts should not consult legislative history, textualists and intentionalists could reach practical agreement without resolving
their larger, theoretical debate.73
The other main institutional consideration that Vermeule
addresses is the lack of coordination within the judiciary.74 Interpretation scholars, Vermeule notes, often offer prescriptions
for “the courts” to adopt, as though the entire judiciary were
governed by some Kantian universal imperative and might, en
masse, adopt a particular interpretive method.75 In reality,
however, no judge can force any other judge to adopt particular
interpretive methods. Indeed, perhaps somewhat curiously,
even when the Supreme Court makes a ruling related to statutory interpretation, it appears to give the ruling stare decisis
effect only as to the particular interpretation reached; neither
the Court nor individual justices seem to regard rulings as having stare decisis effect with regard to interpretive methodology.76 Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, continues his notable
campaign against reliance on legislative history even though
the Supreme Court has expressly rejected his position.77
70. Id. at 115–17.
71. Id. at 116–17.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 118–48.
75. Id. at 119, 122.
76. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial
Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385–90 (2005); see also
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2144 (2002).
77. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (justifying,
in response to a dissent by Justice Scalia, resort to legislative history even in a
case where the statutory text is unambiguous); United States v. Thomp-
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Vermeule observes that this lack of coordination within the
judiciary may significantly impact the effectiveness of various
interpretive methods in reaching desired results.78 In particular, he suggests that “democracy-forcing” interpretive methods—interpretive methods that purportedly improve legislative behavior—may increase judicial error costs if some, but not
all, judges apply such methods.79 For example, some textualists
argue that courts should disregard legislative history because
doing so “fosters the democratic process” by compelling Congress to ensure that it enacts its desires into statutory text.80
However, even assuming that this strategy would have its desired effect if all judges resolutely ignored legislative history,
Vermeule observes that if only some judges refuse to consider
legislative history, but most judges will consider it, then legislators will expect courts to consider legislative history and will
keep using it to communicate their intent to courts.81 The
judges who refuse to consider legislative history will then miss
this indicator of intent, possibly causing them to misinterpret
statutes.82
For this reason, it is incorrect to assume that an individual
judge should choose an interpretive method simply because the
method would have desirable effects if all judges applied it.83
Vermeule calls this incorrect assumption the “fallacy of division.”84 Because no judge can force another judge to adopt a
particular method, Vermeule concludes that each judge must
choose a method that will contribute at least marginal benefits
to the overall judicial system even if other judges do not choose
the same method.85
C. VERMEULE’S PRESCRIPTION
In light of the institutional concerns detailed above,
Vermeule concludes that the most pressing questions in inter-

son/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (plurality opinion) (justifying
resort to legislative history in response to a dissent by Justice Scalia).
78. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 118–48.
79. Id. at 118, 135–37.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
81. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 135–36.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 135.
84. Id. at 121–22.
85. Id. at 121–23, 146–47.
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pretation are not theoretical, but empirical.86 Scholars can endlessly debate whether the ultimate goal of interpretation
should be to discern the meaning of enacted text or, rather, the
intent of those who enacted it. But what we really need to know
is whether particular interpretive methods bring us closer to, or
drive us further away from, either of these goals. The problem,
then, is the empirical one of determining the actual value of interpretive methods. Does reliance on legislative history, for example, help or harm judicial efforts to discern legislative intent? Vermeule complains that scholars have relied on intuition
rather than hard evidence in answering this question.87 It is no
good pointing to particular cases in which legislative history
proved helpful, he says, because those cases might be more
than balanced out by cases in which use of legislative history
harms the interpretive enterprise.88 We need real empirical
evidence on whether legislative history and other interpretive
tools do more good than harm overall.
The problem, of course, is that there is no real empirical
evidence on the value of legislative history or other interpretive
tools and, Vermeule notes, it may be impossible to obtain such
evidence at a reasonable cost within a reasonable time.89 An
empirical study on the usefulness of interpretive techniques
would inevitably suffer from fuzzy categorization of “right” and
“wrong” cases (who would determine which cases reached the
“right” results?), uncertainty about the relevant variables, and
the impossibility of performing direct experiments about the
long-term effects of adopting particular interpretive regimes.90
Unfortunately, judges cannot wait to decide cases until someone collects valid empirical data. Judges need a set of interpretive techniques that are appropriate for use now, despite the
paucity of empirical knowledge about the effectiveness of interpretive techniques—hence, Professor Vermeule’s title, “Judging
Under Uncertainty.”
Vermeule attempts to develop a technique for “judging under uncertainty” by borrowing from “decision theory.”91 Decision theory suggests that, in the face of uncertainty about the
value of interpretive methods, one would, ideally, calculate the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 149, 153.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 158–62.
Id. at 171.
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“expected” value of each method by multiplying each method’s
various possible payoffs by the probability of each payoff.92
However, not only are the payoffs of various interpretive methods unknown, we do not have appropriate numbers—or even,
Vermeule claims, reasonable estimates—to assign to their
probabilities.93 Vermeule therefore turns to a more radical decision technique: the “principle of insufficient reason,” which
consists of assuming that unknown probabilities are equal, i.e.,
that the good and bad aspects of the unknowable effectiveness
of proposed interpretive techniques cancel each other out.94
Vermeule’s answer, in other words, focuses on those outcomes
of interpretive methods that are knowable, and assumes that
everything else washes out in the long run.
Vermeule also notes several other decision theory techniques, only one of which will be mentioned here: “satisficing.”95 This technique consists of searching among options only
until finding a choice that is “good enough.”96 The satisficer
contents herself with a good choice and does not demand the
best choice.97 Armed with these techniques, Vermeule proceeds
to offer prescriptions for judicial interpretation.
1. Statutory Cases
For statutory interpretation, Vermeule proposes that
where the statutory text under consideration is unambiguous,
courts should apply its clear meaning and ignore all other considerations.98 He reaches this conclusion by applying the principle of insufficient reason and the “satisficing” technique to the
situation of courts in our legal system.99
Vermeule observes that courts lack solid empirical data
about the value of most interpretive techniques that go beyond
enforcing the plain meaning of the immediately applicable sta92. Id.
93. See, e.g., id. at 192 (stating that “judges have almost no reliable information” about the reliability of legislative history or its effect on judicial
error; its external costs and benefits are “at best difficult to specify and at
worst wholly indeterminate”).
94. Id. at 173.
95. Id. at 176. I thought this was a contrived word, but according to the
Oxford English Dictionary it has had the meaning Vermeule mentions since at
least 1956. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 504 (2d ed. 1989).
96. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 176–77.
97. Id. at 177.
98. Id. at 183.
99. See, e.g., id. at 192–95.
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tutory text, but they are in a good position to gauge one fact
about these methods: their costs.100 Courts have a comparative
advantage in assessing how interpretive methods affect litigation costs and judicial workloads.101
Vermeule applies this insight to various interpretive techniques, starting with judicial reliance on legislative history. As
noted earlier, judges have little concrete information about how
reliance on legislative history affects the reliability of their decisions. Under the principle of insufficient reason courts would
assume that this factor washes out—that, on balance, reliance
on legislative history neither helps nor harms judicial efforts to
reach the correct interpretations of statutes (on any view of
correctness).102 But courts do know that legislative history is
costly: it is expensive for counsel to research and for courts to
consider.103 In the absence of any empirical reason to believe
that legislative history increases the accuracy of courts’ decisions, Vermeule suggests that courts save themselves and litigants the cost of considering it.104 In other words, in the absence of data regarding which method of statutory
interpretation is best, courts might as well select the cheapest.
Of course, Vermeule acknowledges, minimizing costs is not
the only goal105—we should not try to minimize costs at all
costs, one might say—and it would be wrong to discard reliance
on legislative history if there were no good alternative. But
Vermeule suggests that there is a good alternative—simple reliance on clear statutory text.106 Such a method is “good
enough,” and according to the satisficing technique, when faced
with a method that produces “good enough” results, courts
should not search for other methods that offer uncertain benefits but certain and substantial costs.107 Again, the result is to
discard reliance on legislative history.
Vermeule reaches the same conclusion, for similar reasons,
as to other techniques that go beyond simply enforcing clear
statutory text. He rejects most of the “canons of construction,”
because their benefits are uncertain, but their costs are defi100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 166–68, 192–95.
Id. at 166–68.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 192–97.
Id. at 196.
See, e.g., id. at 183, 196–97.
Id. at 194.
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nite.108 Occasionally, some default canon will be an inevitable
necessity (for example, in the absence of any express statement,
statutes must either be assumed to apply, or not to apply,
extraterritorially).109 In that case, Vermeule asserts, courts
should pick a default rule and be done with it.110 Otherwise,
courts should abandon the canons and enforce statutory plain
text.111 Similarly, comparison of statutory text to similar text in
other statutes, which Vermeule dubs “holistic” statutory interpretation, provides uncertain benefits, but definite costs, and
should also be abandoned.112
In cases where statutory text is not clear, but contains a
gap or ambiguity, Vermeule argues that courts should defer to
an administrative agency’s construction of the statute.113 Administrative agencies, Vermeule argues, have a comparative
advantage over courts in assessing statutory meaning, and this
institutional advantage is the true reason for Chevron deference.114 Agencies have specialized expertise that puts them in
a better position than courts to discern the true meaning of
ambiguous text, and because each agency is a single organ that
can interpret its own organic statute, agencies are free of the
coordination problems courts encounter.115 Courts should therefore adopt agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes without even attempting to use traditional tools of statutory construction to narrow the ambiguity.116 For courts to use such
tools duplicates the costs of agency interpretation without any
certainty of a corresponding benefit.117 Again, cost minimization is not the only goal, but accepting the agency’s interpreta108. Id. at 198–202.
109. Id. at 200.
110. Id. at 201.
111. Id. at 201–02.
112. Id. at 202–05.
113. Id. at 206.
114. Id. at 207–08; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference is most conventionally justified
on the theory that an ambiguous provision in a statute entrusted to an administrative agency constitutes an implicit delegation of power from Congress to
the agency to resolve the statutory ambiguity. See id. at 844. Vermeule contends that, in fact, Congress has neither required nor forbidden courts to
adopt the Chevron principle and that its true justification lies in the agencies’
superior institutional ability to discern statutory meaning. VERMEULE, supra
note 1, at 208–10.
115. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 208.
116. Id. at 211.
117. Id. at 210–11.
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tion is “good enough,” and doing anything more risks incurring
costs with no benefits.118
2. Constitutional Cases
Turning from statutory interpretation to constitutional interpretation, Vermeule applies the same cost-benefit analysis.
He argues that courts should enforce constitutional text that is
clear and specific and should leave everything else—including
enforcement of most of the Bill of Rights and the Equal Protection Clause—to other officials.119 Any other approach, he argues, incurs definite costs but provides only uncertain benefits.120
Vermeule acknowledges that this rule would entail discarding some decisions that are near to our hearts, such as
Brown v. Board of Education,121 but for every Brown, there is a
Dred Scott122—i.e., a case in which the courts wrongly strike
down the work of the political branches.123 If courts have the
power of judicial review, they will inevitably make some bad
uses of it; there is no way to get the good decisions without the
bad ones.124 Thus, instead of focusing only on their favorite decisions, lovers of judicial review must consider the whole range
of decisions in order to determine whether judicial review produces not just good results, but net good results.125
Vermeule again concludes that there is no way to answer
this empirical question. There is no reason, he suggests, to believe that courts have an institutional advantage in interpreting the Constitution.126 Article III courts are free of political
pressure to conform to current majoritarian preferences, but
that does not free them to come to correct constitutional decisions; it just frees them to do whatever they please.127 Like
courts interpreting statutes, courts that attempt to tackle ambiguous constitutional text may make errors of interpretation,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 230–31.
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 231.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 231, 241, 281.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 258–59, 273–75.
Id. at 258–59.
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and we cannot empirically know whether those courts will, on
balance, do more good than harm.128
But we can know, once again, that sophisticated interpretive methods are costly. The decision costs of constitutional interpretive methods are high—originalism, for example, requires extensive historical research.129 Moreover, judicial
review adds a layer of uncertainty to the law that imposes extra costs by complicating planning—parties planning their
primary conduct cannot simply rely on statutes but must consider the possibility that courts will hold the statutes unconstitutional.130
While this aspect of his theory seems even more radical
than his statutory interpretation prescription, Vermeule assures the reader that eliminating judicial review will not lead
to terrible results, such as tyranny.131 He notes that other liberal democracies survive without judicial review.132
Thus, once again, Vermeule maintains that doing anything
other than enforcing clear text, and leaving the rest to other officials, incurs certain costs while yielding no certain benefit.
Vermeule concludes that the courts’ interpretive role should be
as humble in the constitutional arena as it is with regard to
statutes.
II. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE
Professor Vermeule’s work poses a valuable and significant
challenge to the community of interpretation scholars. Many of
us, including myself, have written extensively about cases in
which following plain statutory text leads to the wrong result
and have argued for judicial power to deviate from statutory
text in appropriate cases.133 There is considerable debate about
which cases are “appropriate” for the exercise of such a judicial
power—my own theory calls upon courts to discern the “back128. Id. at 275.
129. Id. at 259.
130. Id. at 275–76.
131. Id. at 265.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 60; Eskridge, supra note 1;
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1023 (1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism];
Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory
Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Statutory
Drafting Errors]; Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235.
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ground principles” underlying the area of law of which a statute is a part and to use those principles as a guide, departing
from statutory text only when the text deviates so surprisingly
from background principles that such departure is justified134—
but some power of judicial reform is a common theme in the
scholarly literature.
Vermeule rightly asks those of us arguing for the existence
of this power to consider whether we really have a basis to believe that the power will, on balance, do more good than harm.
Vermeule rightly observes that once courts have the power to
depart from statutory text, they will inevitably misuse that
power in some cases.135 Therefore, for scholars to prove the value of our pet interpretive techniques, it is not enough to exhibit
particular cases in which the power of judicial departure from
statutory text will provide benefits; we must offer some reason
to believe that the power offers net benefits in light of the possibility of judicial error.
Vermeule also correctly draws attention to the costs that
arise from litigation over whether a court should exercise the
power to depart from statutory text in a given case—a power
that, most agree, should be exercised rarely. Even I, who have
delighted in collecting cases in which application of a strict textualism would make courts look silly, regard such cases as curiosities. Most of the time, as Vermeule observes, simple application of statutory text leads to what all interpreters regard as
the correct result, because the other cues to which some interpreters would also look, such as legislative history or background principles, reinforce a statute’s apparent textual meaning.136 Therefore, interpretation scholars who argue for judges
to look beyond plain meaning are suggesting that courts and
parties must bear the cost of engaging interpretive machinery
that will make a difference only in unusual cases. Is the game
worth the candle?
Vermeule is not the first to attack widely used interpretive
methods on the ground that they fail a cost-benefit test.137 Jus134. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1033,
1043–44, 1054; Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 348.
135. I have always acknowledged this. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1110.
136. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 186 (noting that all interpretive methods agree that clear and specific text is the single best source of interpretive
information); Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 335 n.116
(noting the convergence of interpretive methods in most cases).
137. For a more detailed look at Vermeule’s precursors, see Eskridge, supra
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tice Scalia has long complained that judicial reliance on legislative history is a “waste of research time and ink” that “condemns litigants . . . to subsidizing historical research by lawyers” while being, “on the whole . . . more likely to confuse than
to clarify.”138 But Vermeule has taken the argument to a new
level, making it the centerpiece of an entire theory of interpretation. Vermeule challenges us to consider whether we have
erred in relying on our armchair intuitions in the absence of
empirical data about the value of interpretive methods.
The remainder of this Article attempts to respond to
Vermeule’s challenge. Part II.A first argues that some reliance
on armchair intuition is inevitable in the choice of interpretive
methods, and, indeed, that Vermeule relies on it no less than
anyone else.139 Part II then suggests that to justify employing
interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plain
text, it should be enough to exhibit a reasonable basis for believing that the techniques have a positive net value, even if
that value cannot be precisely gauged. This Article then attempts to offer institutional reasons for such a belief.140
A. COSTS: THE COSTS OF INTERPRETATION AND THE
INEVITABILITY OF ARMCHAIR INTUITION
Professor Vermeule criticizes interpretation scholars for relying on their intuitions regarding the value of interpretive methods in the absence of empirical data. His own theory, he believes, avoids this problem by focusing only on those costs and
benefits of interpretive choices that courts would be in a good
position to gauge. However, a closer look at the costs and benefits involved reveals that Vermeule is as guilty of armchair empiricism as anyone else. He posits, without any real data, that
the costs of the interpretive methods he desires to reject are
“enormous,”141 and he disregards certain costs associated with
his own proposals that might exceed the cost savings his methods would provide.

note 1, at 2044–50.
138. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia also sounded this theme in his book on interpretation. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 36–37.
139. See infra Part II.A.
140. See infra Part II.B–D.
141. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 194.
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1. How Big Are These Costs, Really?
A centerpiece of Professor Vermeule’s theory is his assertion that interpretive methods that go beyond the application of
plain text (or deference to administrative construction of ambiguous text) entail costs that are “enormous.”142 Theoretically,
one might say that Vermeule’s argument does not depend on
the size of these costs. If one adopts the “principle of insufficient reason” and assumes that the net benefits of interpretive
techniques that look beyond plain text are zero, then courts
should, in theory, jettison these techniques even if the resulting
savings were very low—even a dollar of savings would beat zero
dollars of foregone benefits.
Still, if the costs of looking beyond plain text were really
that low, we would all be better advised to argue about something else. Vermeule’s own notion of “satisficing” would suggest
that the current interpretive system is “good enough” unless an
alternative offers a substantial improvement.143 Thus, the enticing notion that implementation of his theory could provide
society with “enormous” cost savings is a central component of
Vermeule’s arguments.
It is notable, therefore, that Vermeule does not attempt to
quantify the costs of the interpretive techniques he criticizes.
He notes only that other interpretation scholars seem to agree
that the costs are high.144 But given that Vermeule criticizes as
“empirically far too ambitious”145 these same scholars’ estimation that the benefits justify the costs, this agreement seems a
slender reed on which to hang his theory. It is true that Professor Eskridge has said that the cost of researching legislative
history “involves a very large number of dollars,”146 but Eskridge offers no data to support this judgment. Similarly, Justice Scalia estimates that when he was head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, his staff spent sixty percent
of its time researching legislative history.147 But if personal ex142. Id. at 194, 210 (referring to the cost of researching legislative history
and the cost of using traditional tools of statutory construction to review administrative interpretation of statutes).
143. See id. at 175 (noting that invocation of the principle of insufficient
reason seems most plausible when “the consideration given dispositive weight
is . . . of the same order of importance as the discarded imponderables”).
144. E.g., id. at 193.
145. Id.
146. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1509, 1541 (1998).
147. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 36–37; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Observa-
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perience provides sufficient data to measure the cost of relying
on legislative history, I would add my own five and a half years
of experience (one year as a law clerk and four and a half as an
advocate in the Department of Justice). While I certainly researched a substantial amount of legislative history, I never
felt it was a particularly grinding burden, especially relative to
the overall costs of litigation. Moreover, in at least one case,
legislative history strongly influenced the litigation in my
client’s favor, a benefit that seemed well worth the cost.148
An evaluation of the cost of interpretive techniques relative
to the overall cost of litigation seems particularly neglected in
Vermeule’s theory. Indeed, even if Vermeule’s theory were fully
adopted by every Article III judge tomorrow, litigation would
hardly cease. Surely the lion’s share of litigation revolves
around disputed facts, and not arguments about the law’s
meaning. Even arguments about statutory interpretation
would continue under Vermeule’s theory because his theory retains for the courts the decision of whether statutory language
is clear or ambiguous.149 The costs involved are not quantifiable—Vermeule himself does not attempt to quantify them—but
a consideration of the litigation that would remain gives some
reason to doubt that the cost savings produced by Vermeule’s
theory would be “enormous.” If the total savings would be
something to the right of the decimal point, the argument for
incurring costs to achieve the best possible methods of interpretation is strengthened.
This point was recently considered by another expert group
of statutory interpreters, the British House of Lords. In deciding whether to relax their rule against judicial consideration of
legislative history, the Lords faced the cost question squarely.150 Over the “practical objection” of the Lord Chancellor that
permitting such consideration might lead to “an immense increase in the cost of litigation in which statutory construction is
involved,”151 the leading opinion stated that “it is easy to overestimate the costs of such research,” and that while the new
tions About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377 (noting
that counsel must consult legislative history not only in litigation, but also in
counseling clients).
148. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Fed. Highway Admin., 56
F.3d 242, 246–47 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
149. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 188–89 (noting that judges may disagree about whether statutory language is clear).
150. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
151. Id. at 614–16 (Lord Mackey, L.C., dissenting).
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practice would “inevitably involve some increase in the use of
time, this will not be significant.”152 This opinion was, it should
be noted, based on the notion that courts would permit consultation of legislative history only in limited cases—more limited
than United States practice allows.153 Still, it shows that experts do not agree on how large the costs of interpretive techniques are, and no one really has definitive information.
2. How Much of the Costs Would Really Be Saved?
But inasmuch as the costs of the interpretive techniques
that Professor Vermeule attacks are unmeasurable, let us assume that they are, at least, large. Even so, adopting Professor
Vermeule’s theory would not necessarily avoid those costs.
a. The Coordination Problem
As noted earlier, Professor Vermeule chides interpretation
scholars for committing the “fallacy of division”—that is, for assuming that methods of statutory interpretation that would result in benefits if adopted by the whole judiciary must also produce benefits even if adopted only by individual judges.154
Vermeule contends that judges must adopt methods that produce benefits notwithstanding the choices of other judges. It is
questionable, however, whether Vermeule’s theory satisfies this
criterion.
Vermeule contends that the benefits of adopting his theory
are “marginal” or “divisible.”155 That is, he contends that each
adoption of his theory by an individual judge will “reduce systemic decision costs and legal uncertainty at the margin.”156
Even if the full benefit of his theory were achieved only when
adopted by all, or at least most, judges, he perceives costs declining continuously as individual judges adopt his theory.
However, this argument seems incorrect. Consider the example of the costs of researching legislative history. With regard to this particular interpretive tool, we have actual experience of what it is like to have Vermeule’s theory adopted by
some, but not many, judges. For nearly twenty years now, Justice Scalia has engaged in a sustained campaign against re-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 636–38.
Id.
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 121–22.
Id. at 226.
Id.
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liance on legislative history,157 and some other judges have
signed on.158 What costs have been avoided as a result of this
campaign? Probably, none.
Consider the plight of counsel arguing a statutory case before the Supreme Court. Counsel knows that citations to legislative history are wasted on Justice Scalia, and perhaps even
on some of his colleagues. Counsel also knows, however, that a
majority of the Justices have expressly stated their willingness
to consider legislative history despite Justice Scalia’s scorn for
it.159 So long as most of the Justices will consider legislative
history, prudent counsel will likely research, brief, and argue
it.160
An actual (if admittedly crude) empirical search bears out
this intuition. LEXIS provides a database of Supreme Court
briefs going back to 1979, so it is possible to compare citations
to legislative history from the pre-Justice Scalia era to those of
the present. A search for citations to House or Senate Reports
in Supreme Court briefs from three five-year periods—one period immediately before Justice Scalia arrived at the Court, one
beginning ten years later, and one twenty years later—reveals
the following:

157. Although Justice Scalia cited legislative history in some of his early
opinions as a Justice, e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 379–81 (1987) (plurality opinion), he soon started to complain about the use of legislative history.
E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529–30 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring). Subsequently, Justice Scalia carried his campaign against legislative history to the point where he regularly declines to join portions of opinions that cite legislative history, even where he joins the remainder of the
opinion. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation,
112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1998). This practice is ongoing. See, e.g., Safeco Ins.
Co. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205 n.* (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia joined
all of the Court’s opinion except for footnotes eleven and fifteen, which discussed legislative history).
158. Justice Thomas, for example, although not as doctrinaire about the
matter as Justice Scalia, has occasionally joined him in rejecting the validity
of reliance on legislative history. For example, he joined Justice Scalia in suggesting that the Court should not “maintain the illusion that legislative history is an important factor in this Court’s deciding of cases, as opposed to an
omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds.” Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993).
160. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 346.
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Table 1: Citations to Legislative History in Supreme Court Briefs
Time
Period

Briefs filed by
parties in the
Supreme
Court161

Briefs citing
House or
Senate
Reports162

Percentage of briefs
citing House or Senate Reports

1/1/1981–
12/31/1985

4111

1326

32.3%

1/1/1991–
12/31/1995

2510

905

36.1%

1/1/2001–
12/31/2005

2642

847

32.1%

If Professor Vermeule’s argument that “marginal” benefits
result as each judge adopts his theory were correct, one would
expect to see a decline in citations to legislative history as a result of Justice Scalia’s sustained campaign against its consideration. In fact, the rate of citations to legislative reports increased somewhat in the early years of Justice Scalia’s
campaign, and after some twenty years of the campaign the
rate is virtually indistinguishable from what is was when Justice Scalia came to the Court in 1986.
Similarly, the trend of the rate of citations to legislative
reports over all completed years in the LEXIS database (1979–
2006)163 is almost completely flat, as shown in the following
graph, in which the X-axis represents the year and the Y-axis is

161. As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and
not DOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in LEXIS’s Supreme Court Briefs database, with the specified date restrictions. All searches were conducted the
week of June 18, 2007. Unfortunately, as I learned by conducting these
searches in February 2007 and then again in June 2007, the data in the
LEXIS databases seem to vary over time—documents appear in or disappear
from the Supreme Court briefs database even for years long past. Thus, it may
be impossible to reproduce these exact results.
162. As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and
(“H.R. Rep.” or “S. Rep.”) and not DOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in LEXIS’s
Supreme Court Briefs database, with the specified date restrictions. Note that
this search counts each brief once, regardless of the number of times a brief
cites legislative reports, so its measure of the amount of citation to legislative
history is obviously not perfect.
163. As revealed by conducting the searches described in the last two footnotes, with year-by-year date restrictions.
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the percentage of party briefs filed that year that cite legislative reports (expressed as a decimal):
Figure 1: Citations to Legislative History in Supreme Court Briefs

The slope of the best linear fit to the year-by-year data over
all years is 0.00049.164 That is, citations to legislative reports
are increasing, but the change is so small that it seems more
accurate to conclude that a single Justice’s campaign against
164. The full data set showing changes in percentage of briefs citing legislative history is:

Year
%

Table 2: Percentage of Supreme Court Briefs Citing
Legislative History by Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
34.3
29.8
37.9
32.3
33.6
29.0
28.9

Year
%

1986
35.7

1987
30.4

1988
28.6

1989
30.4

1990
34.0

1991
46.7

1992
33.9

Year
%

1993
41.5

1994
32.9

1995
34.2

1996
32.7

1997
34.9

1998
38.9

1999
38.8

Year
%

2000
37.6

2001
36.8

2002
34.1

2003
28.8

2004
30.7

2005
30.8

2006
31.7

In the above table, “%” means the percentage of party briefs citing legislative
reports, as shown by the LEXIS Supreme Court Briefs database. The linear
best-fit line was calculated by Quattro Pro.
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legislative history has had no impact on the rate at which parties rely upon it.165
While these admittedly crude data do not fully measure the
overall cost of legislative history research, they support the intuition that counsel will not decrease their use of legislative
history simply because individual judges or Justices refuse to
consider it in reaching a decision.166 Indeed, even if a majority
165. The above tables and chart consider only briefs filed by parties. The
reason for this is that amicus briefs tend to cite legislative history at a different rate than that of party briefs (in the whole LEXIS database from 1979–
2006, 33.1% of party briefs cite legislative reports, but only 27.1% of amicus
briefs do so), and amicus briefs have been increasing (or at least, their representation in the LEXIS database has been increasing) over time: from 1981–
1985, the database contains 45.0% as many amicus briefs as party briefs; from
2001–2005, it contains 62.3% as many amicus briefs as party briefs. Thus,
consideration of trends in citation to legislative reports in all briefs might reveal an apparent decrease in citation rates that could really just be an artifact
of the increasing percentage of amicus briefs (which cite legislative history
less) in the database. It is therefore necessary to look only at the same kind of
brief when doing a multiyear comparison.
The overall trend in citations to legislative reports in the amicus briefs
considered as a separate group, like the trend in the party briefs, is almost
completely flat. The slope of the trend line is −0.00056. Thus, while this trend
is technically decreasing, the effect is minuscule. Moreover, even if one does
look at all briefs, the slope of the overall trend line is −0.00020, again suggesting no impact from a single Justice’s sustained campaign against legislative
history.
Note also that the above data consider citations to legislative reports, not
to legislative history more generally. Legislative reports are the most important form of legislative history, see Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
(1984), so it seems reasonable to focus on them. Similar searches for citations
to the Congressional Record in Supreme Court party briefs from 1979–2006
reveal that the slope of the trend line in their citation is −0.0013. Searches for
citations to committee hearings over the same period show a trend line with a
slope of −0.00023. Again, these are decreases, but only negligible decreases.
Searching for all citations to all three forms of legislative history in party
briefs for the same period reveals a trend line with a slope of 0.0015—an increase, but only a negligible increase.
Thus, while different indicators could be chosen to portray a tiny increase
or tiny decrease in citations to legislative history, the data overall really suggest that Justice Scalia’s refusal to consider legislative history has simply had
no effect on the use of legislative history by parties to Supreme Court litigation.
166. Some previous studies have suggested that Justice Scalia’s campaign
against legislative history has had a notable effect; these studies have gauged
the impact by counting cases in which the Supreme Court itself has relied, or
not relied, on legislative history. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355–56 (1994) (providing statistics regarding the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of legislative
history and concluding that “in slightly more than a decade the Court has
moved from a position in which legislative history was routinely considered in
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of the Court disregarded legislative history and only a minority
continued to consider it, counsel would likely continue to brief
and argue it, because a single Justice’s vote could prove crucial
in deciding a case.167 It would be uncharacteristic for a lawyer
to omit arguments that might prove helpful. When plaintiff’s
counsel in Gibbons v. Ogden concluded his Supreme Court argument with a peroration that quoted Virgil’s Aeneid,168 his opponent did not simply respond, “Virgil is not authority.” Instead, he explained in a three-page peroration of his own why
the quotation from the Aeneid actually supported his side of the
case.169 If lawyers will expend costs to respond to a literary allusion to a poet who has been dead two thousand years, they
are unlikely to neglect arguments based on legislative history
that at least some Supreme Court Justices will consider.170
This same reasoning applies to arguments based on the other
interpretive techniques that Vermeule would have judges abandon.
Vermeule is probably correct that, at some point, some cost
savings would accrue from his theory even if it were not universally adopted. If eight out of nine Supreme Court Justices
renounced reliance on legislative history, counsel might decrease expenditures devoted to researching and briefing legislative history, preferring to put most of their energy into matters
that would likely prove more productive.171 But the actual experience of having an individual Justice reject legislative histoall cases, to a situation in which it is considered by the controlling opinion in
only a small minority of decisions” and that “in most cases, it is not mentioned
at all”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
656–57 (1990) (providing similar statistics). However, the Court’s reduced reliance on legislative history does not imply that any resources will be saved,
because, as the statistics presented herein suggest, counsel will still research
and brief legislative history even if the Court might not rely on it in a given
case. Of course, some slight savings would arise from any individual judge’s
refusal to consider legislative history—that judge’s time will be saved, if nothing else. But given the ratio of resources expended by parties to those expended by courts, these savings may be dismissed as trivial.
167. Rosenkranz, supra note 76, at 2144.
168. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 158 (1824) (argument of Mr. Emmett).
169. Id. at 183–86 (argument of the Attorney General).
170. But see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 103–04 (noting that the government declined to argue the legislative history in the Holy Trinity Church case
and said only that legislative intent should be gathered from the statute itself ) .
171. Professor Vermeule kindly drew my attention to this point in an email exchange.
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ry suggests that the costs of the interpretive techniques that
Vermeule disfavors will not decline continuously as more and
more judges reject them. Rather, it would seem that a “critical
mass” of judges must adopt the theory before it has its desired
cost-reducing effect.172
Thus, the coordination problem to which Professor Vermeule calls attention has the potential to sap a considerable part
of his theory’s benefits. Of course, this objection may seem a little unfair. As Vermeule notes, most interpretation scholars do
not worry about the fallacy of division; they just imagine that
courts will adopt their pet theory en masse and execute it perfectly.173 The next Section examines whether Vermeule’s theory
will produce cost savings under this more typical, Panglossian
assumption. But inasmuch as the main virtue of Vermeule’s
theory is supposed to be that it takes proper account of the
structure of our actual interpretive institutions, it is only fair to
observe that, given the structural reality that individual judges
adopting Vermeule’s theory will lack power to force their colleagues to fall into line, the cost savings that are the theory’s
main benefit seem unlikely to materialize.174
b. Offsetting Costs
The coordination problem is not the only obstacle to achieving the cost savings predicted by Professor Vermeule’s theory.
Even if Vermeule’s book captured the attention and the adherence of the entire Article III judiciary, the cost savings of his
theory would remain speculative.
The problem is that Vermeule focuses on some costs while
neglecting other, offsetting costs. One reason that courts sometimes look beyond the plain text of statutes is that the result
172. Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 226 (denying that adoption of his
theory by a critical mass of judges is necessary for it to have a beneficial effect). Another possibility, suggested to me by my colleague Michael Abramowicz, is that individual adoptions of Vermeule’s theory could at first each produce a slight cost savings, with a substantial savings coming if a critical mass
of judges adopted the theory. Vermeule would then, literally, be correct that
judges could contribute marginally to cost savings by adopting his theory, but
it would be important to note that the savings might be trivial or small until a
critical mass of judges went along.
173. Id. at 123–25.
174. This Section has focused on litigation, but similar remarks would apply to the costs of client counseling and social planning more generally. If
counsel cannot know whether the judges who might ultimately decide an issue
would rely on legislative history, they will have little choice but to consider it
as one factor when counseling clients and planning behavior.
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indicated by the plain text appears costly. Consider, for example, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.175 In this wellknown case, the Supreme Court considered § 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, which instructs the Federal Communications Commission to evaluate applications for broadcast licenses.176 The text of the statute clearly provided that if the
Commission denied an application (and maintained that denial
after giving the applicant a second chance), it was required to
“formally designate the application for hearing.”177 It further
provided that “[a]ny hearing subsequently held upon such application” would be a “full hearing” in which the applicant could
participate.178 Despite this clear statutory command, the Supreme Court approved the agency’s determination that it was
not required to hold a hearing after denying an application if
the application, on its face, did not satisfy valid agency rules
implementing the Communications Act.179 As I have described
in detail elsewhere,180 the Court elevated background principles of administrative law above the dictates of statutory text:
in light of the background principle that hearings exist to resolved disputed facts,181 the Court concluded that Congress did
not intend the agency to “waste time on applications that do
not state a valid basis for a hearing.”182
Imagine, however, that the Court had adopted Professor
Vermeule’s theory. That theory would have obliged the Court to
implement the clear statutory text, and would have required
the agency, therefore, to conduct costly, pointless hearings—
perhaps hundreds per year.183 Presumably, if the costs had
175. United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). For a detailed
discussion of this case, see Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note
133, at 1045–49.
176. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 192–205.
177. Id. at 195–96 n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 205. The agency had denied the particular application in question on the ground that it had previously determined by rule that it would not
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity (the statutory standard
for granting an application) to grant a broadcast license to a party that already had five such licenses, and the application revealed that the applicant
already did have five. See id. at 194 n.1, 195, 197.
180. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1045–
49.
181. See Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 202.
182. Id. at 205.
183. The FCC receives hundreds of applications for broadcast licenses
every year, and it denies, dismisses, or returns hundreds without designating
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been great enough, the agency would have persuaded Congress
to rewrite the statute, but that too would have entailed considerable costs in the form of congressional time.
The point of this example is that a firm decision to implement clear statutory text no matter what may save some judicial costs, but it will likely increase other costs. Congress will
have to bear the costs of correcting foolish decisions resulting
from following plain text. Society will have to bear the costs of
living under foolish decisions until they are corrected.184
Moreover, if courts insist on following plain text no matter
what, Congress will incur increased costs because it will have
to draft statutes more precisely. Interpretive techniques that go
beyond enforcement of plain text permit Congress to save time
and resources in the drafting process. When giving any instructions to anyone, the giver relies on a host of background interpretive understandings that permit the instructions to be given
in a reasonably concise form.185 For example, when a boss tells
a secretary, “this task is urgent—finish it before you leave the
building today,” the boss does not add, “but if the building
catches on fire, you can leave without finishing the task.” However, if the secretary interprets the boss’s instructions literally,
this qualification, as well as many others, would be necessary.
Similarly, if courts insist on following Congress’s apparently
clear textual instructions no matter how absurd the result,
Congress will have to expend more energy drafting literal,
judge-proof instructions.186
As a statutory example, consider the Sherman Antitrust
Act, which provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.”187 As the Supreme Court has long noted,
this statute “cannot mean what it says,”188 because, if applied
them for hearing. See, e.g., 63 FCC ANN. REP. 23 (1997).
184. Professor Eskridge called attention to similar costs in responding to
similar arguments from Justice Scalia. See Eskridge, supra note 146, at 1541–
42.
185. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28–30
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970) (1839); William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat,” 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 (1995) (discussing Lieber’s famous example).
186. Cf. LIEBER, supra note 185, at 30–32 (complaining that strict interpretive principles used by British judges complicate the task of Parliament).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
188. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’ l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978).

2007]

COST-BENEFIT CRUCIBLE

417

literally, it would outlaw virtually all private commercial contracts, inasmuch as restraint is the very essence of such contracts.189 Congress, however, saved itself time and energy by
legislating in this broad and vague fashion, and leaving the rest
to judicial implementation. If the courts had insisted on applying the letter of the law to outlaw all private contracts, not only
would substantial social costs have resulted directly, but Congress would have been forced to expend resources to overturn
the decision and to craft a statute that the judges could enforce
properly.
Vermeule would presumably predict that these costs, assuming them to exist, would be balanced by cost savings from
his theory. Yes, Congress would have to expend energy overturning foolish judicial decisions that refuse to depart from
plain text, but Congress would also save energy by not having
to overturn decisions that wrongly depart from plain text. Similarly, other social actors would have to live with foolish decisions implementing plain text until Congress could overturn
them, but they would be saved the burden of dealing with decisions that wrongly depart from plain text. According to Vermeule, under the “principle of insufficient reason,” any analysis
should assume these costs and benefits cancel each other out.190
The principle of insufficient reason, however, is a doubleedged sword. If unknowable quantities are assumed to cancel
each other out, the principle should be applied more broadly. As
this Section shows, adopting Vermeule’s interpretive methods
would entail a substantial and unknowable shift in costs of
many kinds, including judicial costs, legislative costs, and other
social costs. Following the principle of insufficient reason
should lead to the conclusion that all of the imponderable costs
and benefits that would accrue to Vermeule’s theory would cancel each other out.
Vermeule would say that the judicial cost savings from his
theory are distinct from all other costs, because their direction
is certain and because courts are uniquely well-positioned to
gauge these costs, while they are not in a good position to gauge
other types of costs.191 But, as the previous Sections have suggested, it is far from clear how big these costs are, or how much
of them would really be saved. Indeed, it is not even clear that
Vermeule’s methods will always reduce judicial costs. As Chev189. Id.; Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
190. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 173–74.
191. See id. at 166–68.
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ron litigation under the current system shows, considerable debate can arise over whether statutory text is clear or ambiguous,192 and, under Vermeule’s theory, courts would continue
to make this determination. One can imagine cases in which a
court looking only at the text might need to expend considerable energy deciding whether the text is clear or ambiguous,
whereas other clues beyond the text might settle the matter
fairly easily if the court consulted them.193 While these clues
may not help often, they may sometimes, and under the principle of insufficient reason, unknowables cancel one another
out.194
The point overall is this: Vermeule accuses interpretation
scholars of either neglecting institutional considerations entirely, or, at best, sitting lazily in their academic armchairs and
simply dreaming about institutional costs and benefits, apparently unaware that they lack actual, empirical data. But it is
not clear that Vermeule himself can do any better. Vermeule
offers some intuitive reasons for privileging one particular insight about costs and benefits and then invokes the “principle
of insufficient reason,” seemingly a fancy term for “let’s ignore
everything else.” But it is not clear that the costs and benefits
he privileges are of the “enormous” magnitude he claims; it is
not clear that the savings he ascribes to his theory would really
materialize; and it is not clear to what degree the savings
would be offset by increases in other costs.
It therefore seems that a certain amount of armchair intui192. See id. at 189 (“Judges can . . . hold different views about whether statutory language is clear.”). The recent case of Zuni Public School District No.
89 v. Department of Education, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007), provides an excellent
example: it required Supreme Court litigation to determine whether the statute involved was clear or ambiguous, and, even then, five Justices thought
the agency’s interpretation was a permissible reading of an ambiguous statute. See id. at 1546. Four Justices however, thought the statute so clear that
the agency’s construction deserved no deference. See id. at 1551 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
193. More generally, it is always possible that the interpretive techniques
Vermeule rejects could make the law easier to interpret in a given case, and
thus their use in that case could save costs. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), the British case noted earlier (in which the
House of Lords relaxed its rule against consulting legislative history), provides
an example. The judges felt that the statutory text was ambiguous and that
the two possible interpretations were “nicely balanced,” but that the legislative history made the true construction of the statute clear. Id. at 640–42. In
such a case, a system that rejected legislative history would impose larger
costs of uncertainty and litigation than one that permitted its use.
194. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 173.
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tion is an inevitable part of the debate in this area. If it is good
enough for Vermeule, it should be good enough for the rest of
us. Until someone gathers actual, empirical data, we can, and
indeed must, deploy our intuitions as to the directions of cost
and benefit shifts that would result from adoption of various interpretive methods. Vermeule offers one intuitive insight,
which is not provably wrong, but which is also not provably
right. The remaining Sections of this Article offer competing insights. Each Section responds to Vermeule’s challenge by offering institutional reasons as to why we might be able to gauge
the direction of benefits that accrue to current interpretive methods.
B. BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES
As noted earlier, Professor Vermeule’s theory is essentially
that we do not know whether interpretive techniques that go
beyond enforcement of plain text provide any benefit, but we do
know that they are expensive, so we should discard them and
save the expense. The previous Sections questioned one pillar
of this theory—that an “enormous” cost savings would result
from discarding the interpretive techniques that he disfavors—
and instead suggested that the effect on costs is unknowable.
This Section challenges the other pillar of the theory:
Vermeule’s assertion that we cannot gauge the benefits of interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plain text.
Vermeule asserts not just that the justification for these techniques is less than fully persuasive, but that there is no reason
to think that these techniques, on balance, do more good than
harm.195 For example, regarding holistic textualism, a method
of interpretation appealing to sources beyond the statute’s text
to ascertain meaning, Vermeule says that “there is no particular reason to think that the illuminating effect of holistic textualism will predominate over its error-producing effect.”196 He
similarly states that “there is no reason at all to think that the
tools of judicial gap-filling are superior to agency interpretation”197 and that “[t]here is no particular reason to believe that
judges are better positioned than legislators to update constitutional principles and rules through incremental decisionmaking over time.”198
195.
196.
197.
198.

See, e.g., id. at 205, 210, 273–74.
Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
Id. at 273–74 (emphasis added).
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Vermeule’s contention that there is no reason to believe in
the value of certain interpretive techniques is essential to his
theory of interpretation. Both Vermeule’s appeal to the “principle of insufficient reason” and his assumption that the costs
and benefits of interpretive techniques that go beyond plain
text wash each other out are valid only if we really have no basis for estimating the probability that these interpretive techniques will help or harm. Even a modest shift in the probabilities—say, if certain interpretive techniques led courts astray in
forty percent of the cases, but were helpful in the remaining
sixty percent—would undermine the “washing out” hypothesis
fundamental to Vermeule’s theory.199
This Section suggests that there is some reason to believe
that courts can, on balance, reach better results by employing
techniques other than straightforward enforcement of statutory
texts. The reasons are institutional. As noted earlier, one of
Vermeule’s central points is that the choice of interpretive methods should be informed by institutional considerations,200 and
he permits some elements of his overall cost-benefit analysis to
be privileged (and thus exempt from the principle of insufficient reason) on the basis of what is essentially a probabilistic
judgment that courts are in a good institutional position to
gauge them.201 Therefore, it should be equally legitimate to rely
on institutional reasons why courts are well-positioned to look
beyond plain statutory text in certain respects.
The first critical institutional consideration, which I have
highlighted elsewhere, is that courts act at the moment the statutory text is actually applied to a particular case.202 In contrast to legislatures, which act generally and in advance, and
thus cannot anticipate every circumstance to which statutes
will apply,203 courts are better positioned to use certain interpretive techniques. Consider, for example, the interpretive
principle that courts should construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results. Vermeule does not definitively state what should
happen to this principle under his theory, and it is a principle
accepted even by most textualist judges and scholars.204 How199. See id. at 174.
200. Id. at 15–39.
201. See, e.g., id. at 192 (arguing that courts are in a good position to gauge
the litigation costs imposed by judicial resort to legislative history).
202. See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 341–43.
203. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
204. Justice Scalia, for example, approves it. See Holloway v. United
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ever, based on Vermeule’s arguments, the absurd results principle would have to go. Vermeule observes that judges applying
the principle may err; they may erroneously identify a statutory application as absurd because of their insufficient ability to
perceive the policies and purposes of the statute.205 In the absence of any hard data as to the rate of correct versus mistaken
applications of the absurd results principle, Vermeule would
presumably appeal to the “principle of insufficient reason” and
conclude the rates are equal.206 Thus, he would conclude that
the value of permitting courts to apply the absurd results principle is speculative, but its costs are definite—it increases litigation and decision costs and introduces uncertainty into the
law.207 Therefore, it should be discarded.208
However, because of their institutional feature that they
act at the moment of statutory implementation, courts can
probably produce net benefits by applying the absurdity principle. Legislatures are institutionally disadvantaged when it
comes to appreciating the potential absurdity of what they
write. No matter how much work they do in advance, they will
make some mistakes that come to light only afterwards.209
Courts, on the other hand, are in a position to see the statute
after the drafting process, when its absurdity may be apparent
in light of the particular case in which it arises.
Another institutional feature that promotes the courts’ capacity to apply the absurdity principle is the availability of
judicial time to focus on discrete statutory provisions. Vermeule
emphasizes the limited time and attention of courts,210 which is
certainly a valid point, but at least courts faced with an arguStates, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA,
supra note 2, at 20.
205. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 20, 37.
206. See id. at 173–75.
207. See id. at 18–24.
208. Vermeule expressly discusses and rejects only some interpretive techniques that go beyond implementation of plain text, particularly, looking to
legislative history, applying canons of construction, and “holistically” comparing statutory text to other statutory text. Id. at 183–229. Still, rejection of all
techniques that go beyond implementation of plain text is implicit in Vermeule’s overall conclusion that “[w]hen the statutory text directly at hand is clear
and specific, judges should stick close to its surface or apparent meaning,
eschewing the use of other tools to enrich their sense of meaning, intentions,
or purposes.” Id. at 183.
209. See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 341–43.
210. E.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that courts “operate under significant constraints of time, information, and expertise”).
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ment that statutory text dictates an absurd result can take the
time necessary to consider the argument. The hurly-burly of
the legislative process, on the other hand, and the need to vote
up or down on an entire statute at the moment it comes before
the legislature for a vote, put the legislature in a less advantageous position to discover absurdities in individual statutory
provisions.
None of this is to suggest that courts exercising the power
to deviate from clear—but absurd—statutory text will always
do so correctly. Once a power of deviation exists, it seems impossible to deny Vermeule’s charge that courts will sometimes
use it unwisely.211 But it does suggest that there are reasons—
institutional reasons—why legislatures, even if made up of legislators who individually are perfectly reasonable and rational,
will write absurdities into statutory text that courts will later
discover. It also suggests that when a court, acting with due regard for the presumption that the legislature meant what it
said, concludes that the legislature cannot have meant what it
said because what it said is absurd, the court’s conclusion likely
has some merit because the court has an institutional advantage over the legislature in the discovery of statutory absurdity.
And that is all one needs to refute Vermeule’s theory.
There is no need to quantify the exact probabilities involved.
Vermeule’s theory, particularly his invocation of the “principle
of insufficient reason,” depends critically on the assumption
that judicial reliance on extratextual interpretive techniques
such as the rule against absurd results has zero net benefit.
This assumption is valid only if we assume that a judicial decision based on the absurdity principle is as likely to be wrong as
to be right. If the likelihood of correct judicial implementation
of the absurdity principle even slightly outweighs the likelihood
of incorrect implementation, then the assertion that the principle has no benefit collapses, and with it, the conclusion that
we should discard the principle to avoid its costs. Rather, we
must compare the costs of implementing the absurdity principle against its benefits and, since both are unmeasurable, the
possibility remains that the benefits exceed its costs.
This line of argument does not refute all of Vermeule’s conclusions. The courts’ comparative advantage that results from
their interpretation of statutory text at the moment of implementation says nothing, for example, about the usefulness of
211. See id. at 20, 192–94.
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legislative history. It does, however, suggest that courts have a
similar comparative advantage at detecting statutory drafting
errors by applying background principles of law. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, the absurdity principle does not fully capture the set of cases in which courts should be able to deviate from statutory text.212 A statute’s startling departure
from background principles of law may indicate that the statute is erroneously drafted even if following the statute’s literal
text would not produce an “absurd” result.213 Courts should
have the power to deviate from statutory text in such cases214
and, again, contrary to Vermeule’s conclusions,215 institutional
features of courts support this view. The fact that courts interpret statutes at the moment of implementation puts them in
a good position to detect startling deviations from background
understandings that escaped detection in the legislative
process.216 This institutional advantage suggests that courts
can likely produce net benefits by using the process of interpretation to maintain statutory coherence with background principles of law.217
In sum, Vermeule goes too far in asserting that there is no
reason to think that courts can add value to the interpretive
process by sometimes departing from plain text. There is some
reason, stemming from institutional features of courts. The features do not come with concrete numbers, but neither does
Vermeule’s own reasoning.
C. THE ROLE OF AGENCIES
So far, this Article has considered only what Professor
Vermeule calls “Type 1” cases, that is, cases in which the statutory text immediately at hand is clear and specific.218 In “Type
212. Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 326–32.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 348.
215. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 27, 203–05.
216. Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 341–43.
217. This is why I have always emphasized the role of background principles in the process of statutory construction while being rather agnostic on
the legislative history question. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1024; Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at
358. I have argued that there is no constitutional obstacle to judicial reliance
on legislative history, see Siegel, Use of Legislative History, supra note 2, but
have not passed judgment on the argument, emphasized by Vermeule, that it
is just more trouble than it is worth. See id. at 1518–19.
218. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 189.
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2” cases, in which courts must apply ambiguous statutory text,
Vermeule advises courts to defer to administrative or other executive construction of the statute, without consulting traditional tools of statutory construction to try to resolve the ambiguity.219 As noted earlier, Vermeule rejects the formal,
conventional justification for deference—that ambiguous agency statutes constitute an implicit delegation of power from
Congress to the agencies to resolve the ambiguities.220 Rather,
he relies on practical, institutional considerations. He reasons
that agencies are better positioned than courts to understand
the meanings of the statutes they administer, and judicial use
of traditional tools of statutory construction to review an agency’s interpretation would entail duplicative costs and add to legal uncertainty without offering any likely benefit.221
Vermeule is surely onto something here. I have argued at
length elsewhere that the background principles of any area of
law are necessary guides to construing statutes related to that
area.222 If that is true, then it makes sense to desire that statutes be construed by those with the best understanding of
those background principles. Agencies, like courts, have the institutional advantage of construing statutes in the course of
their implementation. Thus, courts gain no edge over agencies
on this point, and agencies have the further advantage of specialized subject-matter expertise. Putting aside exceptions such
as the Federal Circuit (which, because of its specialized jurisdiction, might be expected to know as much about patent law
as the Patent Office),223 agencies will know more about their
organic statutes, which they administer on a daily basis, and be
better able to discern the background principles underlying
those statutes, than a court that may encounter an agency’s
statute only sporadically. Moreover, as Vermeule observes,
each agency is a single organ that can produce a unified construction of a statute, whereas the process of producing a coor-

219. Id. at 205–07; see also id. at 227–28 (exhibiting Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), as a model
of appropriate judicial modesty).
220. Id. at 207–08.
221. Id. at 208–12.
222. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133; Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in patent cases).
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dinated judicial interpretation is rather clumsy and inefficient.224
Thus, it might seem that those who preach the virtues of
background principles as a guide to statutory interpretation
would be the most enthusiastic supporters of Professor Vermeule’s proposed regime of strong deference to agency interpretations. Again, however, Vermeule’s analysis gives too little
weight to institutional advantages of courts. The previous Section focused on institutional advantages stemming from a vital
difference between the courts and Congress, namely, that
courts interpret statutes at the moment of application.225 Here,
the key is the most vital difference between courts and agencies, namely, the courts’ advantage in providing checks and
balances. Once again, the courts’ institutional position gives
them a vital role to play in statutory interpretation that cannot
be properly fulfilled by applying Vermeule’s theory.
Vermeule gives only passing attention to the role that separation-of-powers considerations should play in the choice of
interpretive methods. He takes note of the political insulation
of courts, but considers it only in relation to the courts’ interpretive capabilities, and he does not believe it gives courts any
comparative advantage over agencies in that regard.226 Politically responsive agencies, he suggests, will be closer to the legislative process and more familiar with a statute’s original purpose than courts, and better able to discern those purposes
from legislative history.227 The political insulation of courts
frees them, Vermeule acknowledges, from the pressure to construe statutes in accordance with current majoritarian desires,
but that does not mean they will do better than agencies at understanding a statute’s original meaning.228
In offering such a stingy view of the courts’ potential value,
Vermeule gives too little weight to the courts’ vital role of
checking the executive. This role arises not merely from the
courts’ political insulation, but from their status as a separate
branch of government that does not participate in the primary

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 208.
See supra Part II.B.
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 209–11.
Id.
Id.
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formulation or execution of policy.229 If that role were removed,
executive agencies would have a greatly enhanced ability to set
the limits of their own power.230 The executive has a strong
tendency to aggrandize its own power even with courts playing
the role that they play now;231 one shudders to think what
would happen if the courts did not play a checking role.
Consider, for example, the current administration’s assertion that Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), enacted after September 11, 2001, authorizes the
President to order warrantless electronic surveillance of persons within the United States.232 Under Vermeule’s interpretive theory, because the President’s claimed statutory authority
for his surveillance power—the AUMF’s simple statement that
the President is “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those who planned, authorized, or committed
the 9/11 attacks233—is less than perfectly clear, courts should
defer to the executive’s construction without even considering
traditional canons of statutory construction.234 These canons,
such as the canons that the specific controls the general,235 or
that repeals by implication are disfavored,236 might lead to the
conclusion that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act still
governs domestic electronic surveillance and the President’s
claimed power does not exist.237
229. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative
State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory
Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1283–85 (2002).
230. Id. at 1285–86.
231. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 497–98, 525 (1989) (noting that Chevron’s rule already tends to “swell agency power” and “enlarges
the quantum of administrative discretion potentially amenable to direction
from the White House”).
232. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001); Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea,
Legislative Attorneys, Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006); Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy
Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005).
233. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2.
234. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 187.
235. E.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–
29 (1957).
236. E.g., Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132
(2003).
237. Cf. Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, supra
note 232, at 40–44 (discussing these issues at length).
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Of course, consistent with his “washing out” theory,
Vermeule would presumably assert that while courts might
rightly prevent the executive from invading civil liberties, they
might just as well wrongly prevent the executive from engaging
in surveillance that is necessary to prevent terrorism. With no
basis for believing that the courts will understand congressional instructions any better than the agencies, the principle of insufficient reason would suggest that good and bad court decisions will cancel each other out. Therefore, Vermeule would
conclude, judicial review of agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes incurs costs but provides no benefit, and so
courts should not engage in such review.
Again, however, institutional considerations suggest that
we can at least predict the sign of the value of judicial review of
agency interpretations, even if we cannot estimate its exact
magnitude. The critical institutional consideration here is the
natural tendency of the executive to aggrandize its own power.
The judiciary’s comparative advantage arises not only from its
political insulation, but also from its removal from primary policy formulation and implementation. The executive is motivated in part by its desire to give itself the broadest powers
that will permit the maximum implementation of its preferred
policies. The judiciary cannot wrest the primary policy role
from the executive; all it can do is check the executive’s tendencies.238 The judiciary’s limited role in reviewing the executive’s
action for legality rather than in formulating policy also restricts the judiciary.239 While the judiciary will not perform its
function perfectly, we can expect that it will serve as a valuable
counterweight to the executive’s natural self-aggrandizing tendencies.240 This benefit is sufficient ground for incurring the
costs of maintaining the judicial role in reviewing agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. As the previous Section explained, to defeat Vermeule’s application of the principle of insufficient reason, we need only some reason to believe that
maintaining the judicial role will be more beneficial than harmful.241

238. Molot, supra note 229, at 1283–85.
239. See id.
240. Cf. id. at 1292–1313 (explaining why the judicial role in statutory interpretation should be retained for institutional reasons even if the judiciary
cannot be expected to act as perfectly faithful congressional agents).
241. See supra Part II.B.
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D. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Professor Vermeule’s theory of statutory interpretation
could conceivably attract some adherents; his theory of constitutional interpretation seems unlikely to do so. Vermeule recognizes that many will find this part of his theory “beyond the
pale.”242 Still, he rightly offers the same challenge to constitutional theorists as to statutory interpretation scholars: can we
really know that judicial review produces, not just some good
cases, but net benefits overall? Once again, it is necessary to offer institutional reasons to believe that judicial review does
more good than harm.
In a recent book chapter, I suggested some such reasons.243
Perceiving them requires looking beyond the institutional feature of courts upon which Vermeule primarily focuses: the
courts’ insulation from politics.244 As noted earlier, Vermeule
rejects the notion that political insulation puts courts in a better position than political actors to interpret the Constitution.245 However, the institutional advantage of the judiciary
with regard to constitutional interpretation lies not only in the
judiciary’s political insulation, but also in a constellation of institutional features that make the judiciary the branch best positioned to give constitutional guarantees real meaning.
To see the judiciary’s advantage, consider Vermeule’s suggestion that constitutional guarantees (other than those that
are quite clear and specific) be enforced by the political
branches themselves. Vermeule suggests that the legislature
can be trusted just as well as judges to enforce the Constitution, and he notes that “even on the crudest model of legislators
as reelection maximizers, legislators will enforce constitutional
rules if that is what constituents demand.”246 Thus, Vermeule
242. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 231.
243. Jonathan R. Siegel, Political Questions and Political Remedies, in THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 243 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Siegel, Political Questions]. The chapter primarily questioned the degree to
which the political question doctrine should restrain judicial review, but most
of the arguments apply equally in response to Professor Vermeule.
244. See U.S. CONST. art. III; VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 258–59.
245. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
246. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 259. Vermeule draws on Larry Kramer’s
suggestion that the framers envisioned the Constitution being enforced “as a
result of republican institutions and the citizenry’s own commitment to its
founding document.” Id. at 235; see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court,
2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (2001).
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envisions that political pressures will play a role in constitutional enforcement. There are, however, vital institutional reasons to question whether such a system of enforcement can
properly give meaning to constitutional guarantees.
Under Vermeule’s proposal, a person or group desiring enforcement of a less-than-perfectly-clear constitutional provision, such as the Free Speech Clause, could not seek judicial
review. The only available enforcement mechanism would be
political agitation, which could take place either in the electoral
or legislative arena. Both of these, however, lack institutional
features that are critical to making the Free Speech Clause a
meaningful guarantee of rights.
First, consider the possibility of trying to correct an alleged
violation of Free Speech rights through the electoral process.
Such a program would face enormous practical problems. The
violation might be a minor one that would not likely gain much
traction in any electoral campaign. Even if it were more significant, the costs of engaging the political process would surely
outweigh the cost of bringing a lawsuit by a considerable multiple.247 Inasmuch as Vermeule’s theory is driven largely by
cost considerations, this point seems highly significant.
Beyond these practical points, however, there are crucial
theoretical and institutional differences between the electoral
process and the judicial process. First, the judicial process is focused: parties come to court with a specific claim of right and
the court can issue a ruling on that precise claim. Elections, by
contrast, are the very opposite. Even if a constitutional issue
played some role in an election (say, because a political group
was attempting to defeat political candidates who supported
what the group viewed as unconstitutional legislation), the constitutional issue would be only one of dozens of issues that
come into play in any election, and the other issues could easily
drown out the importance of the constitutional claim. Elections
are not referendums; they do not provide a focused mechanism
through which voters can express their preferences on constitutional issues.248
247. Even a single congressional race costs millions of dollars these days,
far exceeding the likely cost of a suit challenging the lawfulness of government
action. See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Election Commission, Congressional
Candidates Spend $1.16 Billion During 2003–2004 (June 9, 2005).
248. See Siegel, Political Questions, supra note 243, at 259; see also Donald
L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 99 (1985).
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Moreover, even if voters managed to use an election to defeat politicians who supported allegedly unconstitutional legislation, the result would still fail to provide effective enforcement of constitutional guarantees because it would be
impossible to say that the election had established any constitutional rule. Elections have the institutional feature that they
are inscrutable. They yield only a result, not a statement of
reasons. One could sense that constitutional issues played a
role in a politician’s defeat, but one could never really be sure;
perhaps the politician would have lost anyway. The judicial
process, by contrast, provides a statement of reasons for its decisions.249 These statements of reasons can truly establish constitutional principles, because they expressly articulate legal
norms that show why one party wins and the other loses. Elections do not articulate norms.
Moreover, the electoral system does not operate within a
system of precedent. Because, as just noted, elections yield only
a result and provide no statement of reasons, it would be impossible for voters to follow the precedent set by elections, even
if they wanted to. Moreover, even if voters somehow understood
an election result to have turned on a constitutional issue, no
rule in the electoral system requires the voters to vote the same
way at the next election. The judicial process, by contrast, operates within a system of precedent that tends to ensure that
constitutional norms remain established.
Finally, the electoral process is majoritarian. Politicians
who take action that might violate constitutional guarantees
presumably do so because they believe they will gain political
advantage.250 If the politicians correctly detect the popular
mood, they may prevail despite the unconstitutionality of their
actions. The electoral process could hardly serve as a good institutional mechanism for putting certain matters beyond majoritarian control. In contrast, the judicial process can check
majoritarian tendencies because of the political insulation of
judges.
Thus, there are several institutional reasons why the electoral process seems a poor vehicle for enforcement of constitutional guarantees. Vermeule also suggests the possibility of enforcement of constitutional guarantees through the political
249. Cf. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1292 (1975) (noting the importance of the statement of reasons).
250. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (1962).
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process more generally, rather than simply at the ballot box.251
Even legislators who do not fear electoral defeat over a particular constitutional issue might desire to placate a group that
feels strongly about it. Therefore, the legislative process might
provide a vehicle for enforcement of constitutional guarantees
even if the electoral process itself does not.
Despite this possibility, there are important institutional
reasons to suspect that the legislative process will be inferior to
the judicial process in this regard. The legislative process might
avoid some difficulties with the electoral process: it has at least
some potential to be more focused and less inscrutable than the
electoral process. A particular constitutional issue could be decided on an up-or-down legislative vote. But this does not always happen; constitutionally doubtful provisions might appear
in the same bill as other, vital matters, and the vagaries of the
legislative process might never allow a vote on the doubtful
provisions independent of the bill as a whole. The legislature
might vote for the bill as a whole because its overall virtues
outweigh any doubts about the constitutionality of a particular
provisions. Thus, the legislative process, like the electoral
process, might lack the focused nature of the judicial process.
Also, the legislative process is majoritarian in nature and
seems unlikely to be a good mechanism to enforce restraints on
majoritarianism.
In addition, the legislative process does not operate within
a system of precedent. One Congress can always undo what a
previous Congress has enacted. Vermeule makes the interesting argument that the legislative process may have a stronger
tendency to respect precedent than the judicial process because
the legislature has formal requirements for changing the law
from the status quo (it must pass a new bill through the bicameral process), whereas the judiciary has no formal restraint on
overruling its past decisions.252 Still, the judicial process operates within an ethic whereby precedent ought to be respected
over time, whereas it is regarded as altogether appropriate for
a legislature to repeal previous statutes, or to enact statutes
that a prior legislature declined to enact, for no other reason
than that its membership has changed. Like the electoral
process, therefore, the legislative process seems a poor structure for the establishment and enforcement of constitutional
guarantees. Without a system of precedent, constitutional
251. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 251–52.
252. Id. at 274.
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guarantees can never really be established. Even if a potentially unconstitutional bill were legislatively defeated on constitutional grounds, the defeat would not establish a constitutional
norm. Proponents of the bill could just keep reintroducing it
until it passed.
Finally, and most importantly, unlike elections and judicial
process, the legislative process is not available to citizens as a
matter of right. Disgruntled citizens can complain to the legislature that a statute violates their constitutional rights, but
they cannot compel the legislature to vote on their complaint.
The legislature may simply ignore the issue indefinitely. In
contrast, elections are mandatory: they occur at constitutionally specified intervals. Similarly, the judicial process provides a
mandatory mechanism for resolution of claims of constitutional
right.253 Courts must respond to constitutional claims, perhaps
rejecting them on their merits, of course, but not ignoring them
altogether.
Therefore, in considering the institutional features of
courts in relation to their suitability to conduct judicial review,
it is not just the political insulation of courts that matters. That
is an important feature, to be sure. As noted in the previous
Section, the separation of the judicial power from the political
branches enables the courts to check the political branch’s natural self-aggrandizing tendency. But it is the whole range of
the judiciary’s institutional features that contributes to the suitability of courts as implementers of constitutional guarantees.
The fact that the judicial power is focused, that it is mandatory,
that it provides reasons for its decisions, and that it operates
within a system of precedent, all contribute to having a system
in which constitutional guarantees are meaningful. The electoral and legislative processes do not offer these features.254
Thus, again, while one must concede that the power of
judicial review can be used for ill as well as for good, there are
institutional reasons to believe that it offers net benefits. Once
the likely benefits of the process are demonstrated, Vermeule’s
argument fails. One can no longer accept his argument that inasmuch as the expected net benefits are zero, we might as well
eliminate judicial review and save its costs.
253. As Chief Justice Marshall remarked in Cohens v. Virginia, “[t]he judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches
the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful.”
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
254. See Siegel, Political Questions, supra note 243.
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CONCLUSION
Professor Vermeule’s book offers a useful challenge to conventional thinking about the judicial role in interpreting statutes and the Constitution. Formal, theoretical arguments have
dominated the debate, with many scholars focusing on questions such as whether the Constitution requires courts to follow
certain rules of interpretation, and whether the ultimate guide
to statutory meaning is found in statutory text or in legislative
intent. Vermeule offers a shift in thinking and makes the intriguing suggestion that those battling over interpretive theories
might, in the end, agree on interpretive methods, thus rendering the theoretical debates irrelevant, if only they were to focus
on how the institutional failings of courts interfere with ideal
implementation of interpretive theories. Vermeule rightly challenges those who call upon courts to employ allegedly sophisticated interpretive techniques and to depart from statutory text
in some cases to offer reasons demonstrating that these methods will not only produce superior results in isolated cases,
but will, on the whole, do more good than harm.
However, this Article has suggested that Vermeule has not
considered a sufficient range of institutional features of the
courts. The courts’ political insulation, to which he adverts, is
certainly an important feature, but it is by no means the only
important feature that has implications for the courts’ role in
interpretation. The timing of judicial action, and particularly
the fact that courts interpret statutes at the moment of implementation, implies that they have an institutional advantage in
detecting cases in which departure from statutory text is appropriate. The courts’ separation from the primary role in formulating and implementing policy also puts them in a good position to counteract the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the
political branches. And a range of institutional features of the
judicial process—that it is mandatory, that it is focused, that it
provides reasons for its decisions, and that it operates within a
system of precedent—make it a superior choice for the enforcement of constitutional norms. These institutional features
of courts suggest that there are likely benefits to allowing
courts to use interpretive methods that go beyond Vermeule’s
ultrastrict textualism. These benefits defeat his suggestion that
courts should abandon all such methods on the grounds that
they have zero benefits, but positive costs.

